The Siege of Savannah - Chapters V-VII



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CHAPTER V.
The Siege of Savannah--Concentration of Confederate Forces for the Defense 
of the City--Investment by the United States Forces--Federal attempts to 
Communicate with the Fleet--Confederate Line at Monteith--Obstruction of 
Roads leading into Savannah--Western Line for the Protection of the City, 
its Location, Principal Batteries, and Armament--Enumeration of Light 
Artillery Companies Concentrated for its Support--Inundation of the Low 
Grounds in front of this Western Line--the Western Line, how Subdivided, 
Commanded, and Garrisoned--Supply of Ordnance, Quarter-Master, and 
Commissary Stores--Statement of Rations Issued. 

   Although every effort had been made to concentrate a large force for 
the defense of Savannah, such was the pressure upon the Confederacy and so 
great the paucity of troops, that at the inception and during the progress 
of the siege there were not more than ten thousand men fit for duty within 
the Confederate lines around that city. Nearly one half of these consisted 
of reserves and militia, and considerable details were employed in 
garrisoning the forts and fixed batteries in the Savannah river and along 
the line of the water approaches. No lack of patriotism existed on the 
part of the citizens, who responded freely to the following spirited 
address of their honored mayor. 

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Mayor's Office,
Savannah, November 28th, 1864. Fellow Citizens, 

   The time has come when every male who can shoulder a musket can make 
himself useful in defending our hearths and homes. Our city is well 
fortified, and the old can fight in the trenches as well as the young; and 
a determined and brave force can, behind entrenchments, successfully repel 
the assaults of treble their number. 

   The general commanding this division has issued a call for all men of 
every age, not absolutely incapacitated from disease, to report at once to 
Captn. C. W. Howard, at the Oglethorpe barracks, for the purpose of 
organizing into companies for home defense. I call upon every man not 
already enrolled in a local corps to come forward at once and report to 
Captain Howard. Organization is everything. Let us emulate the noble 
examples of our sister cities of Macon and Augusta where the whole male 
population is in arms. By manning the fortifications we will leave free 
the younger men to act in the field. By prompt action a large local force 
can be organized from our citizens above the military age, and from those 
who have been exempted from field service. 

   No time is to be lost. The man who will not comprehend and respond to 
the emergency of the times, is forsworn to his duty and to his country. 

R. D. ARNOLD, Mayor.

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   By the evening of the 9th of December, all the Confederate forces which 
could be concentrated were in position along the newly constructed western 
lines extending from the Savannah river on the right, at Williamson's 
plantation, to the Atlantic and Gulf railway bridge across the Little 
Ogeechee, on the left. Care had been taken to remove all serviceable 
rolling stock belonging to the Central rail road and banking company, the 
Atlantic and Gulf rail road company, and the Charleston and Savannah rail 
road company. 

   On the 10th of December, 1864, Sherman's army closed in upon the 
Confederate works covering the land approaches to the city of Savannah. 
With this date the history of the siege properly commences. 

   In coming into position in front of Savannah the Federal corps were 
distributed as follows: General Williams's 20th Corps held the left of the 
Union line resting upon the Savannah river near Williamson's plantation, 
in advance of Pipe-makers creek, its right extending across the Charleston 
and Savannah rail road to the Central rail road where it joined the left 
of Genl. Jeff C. Davis's 14th Army Corps. 

   This 14th Army Corps, constituting the right of the left wing, extended 
from the Central rail road on the left to the 17th Army Corps, whose left 

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rested beyond the Savannah and Ogeechee canal, near Lawton's plantation. 

   Shortly after this development of the left wing, the right, under Major 
General Howard, came into the following position. The 17th Corps, 
commanded by General Frank P. Blair jr., lay next beyond and to the right 
of the 14th Army Corps, while General Osterhaus's 15th Corps, with its 
right resting on the Atlantic and Gulf rail road near station number one, 
formed the extreme right of the Federal investment. 

   After crossing Ebenezer creek on the 8th of December, Kilpatrick 
concentrated his cavalry on the Monteith road, ten miles south of 
Springfield; and, until the 13th, moved in rear of the 17th Army Corps, 
with detachments covering the rear of the other army corps. 

   King's bridge having been burnt by the Confederates, Kilpatrick crossed 
the Great Ogeechee on a pontoon bridge, on the afternoon of the 13th, and 
moved in heavy force through the counties of Bryan and Liberty, seeking to 
communicate with the Federal fleet by way of Kilkenny bluff and Sunbury. 
Returning on the 16th, he went into camp in the vicinity of King's bridge, 
picketing and plundering the country south of the Ogeechee. 

   The attempt of Coln. Atkins, with two thousand cavalry supported by a 
division of infantry under 

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General Mower, to destroy the railway bridge over the Alatamaha river, 
failed. 

   Upon the first appearance of the enemy the Confederate cavalry, 
stationed at detached points along the coast south of the Great Ogeechee, 
hastily retreated beyond the Alatamaha, leaving the region lately occupied 
by them an open prey to the daily incursions of small bodies of Federal 
cavalry who wantonly insulted and robbed defenseless women, children, and 
old men, and perpetrated repeated acts of violence, lawlessness, and 
horrid depravity. During the entire march from Atlanta, the conduct of 
Kilpatrick's cavalry was characterized by constant acts of brutality, 
theft, and insult. 

   The Federal artillery was distributed at convenient intervals and at 
suitable locations all along the line, but was chiefly massed opposite the 
Confederate redoubts on our right, in front of Daly's farm, the battery on 
Lawton's plantation, and the work at Salt creek bridge. The work last 
mentioned, known as Battery Jones, was subjected to an incessant and 
severe fire during the continuance of the siege. 

   The advanced line, selected by the engineers for the defense of 
Savannah, included the protection of the Charleston and Savannah rail road 
and its bridge across the Savannah river. Extending thence along, and 
having Monteith swamp in its 

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front, its left rested upon the Great Ogeechee river. Detached field works 
had been hastily prepared at important points, and some light artillery 
and infantry put in position. The principal roads leading to Savannah and 
the main avenues of approach had been blocked up by felling timber across 
them, and it was hoped that these obstructions would induce the Federal 
general to turn aside and seek some objective on the coast other than 
Savannah. 

   The paucity of the Confederate forces, the overwhelming strength of the 
enemy, the length and insecurity of the line, later and more careful 
surveys proving localities to be practicable which were deemed impassable, 
the Federal ability by means of well appointed pioneer corps in a short 
time to remove all hindrances to an advance, and the facility with which 
detached earth works, constituting the principal defenses, could be 
flanked, induced the evacuation of this line shortly after a serious 
demonstration was made against it by the enemy. 

   The second line, and that persistently held by the Confederates during 
the siege, commenced at Williamson's plantation on the Savannah river, 
having the rice field in its front; thence, extending along the high 
ground, and still keeping the swamp in front, it crossed the Central 

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rail road, followed the crest of Daly's farm, passed through Lawton's 
plantation, confronted the rice fields of Silk Hope plantation, and, 
following the left shore of Salt creek marshes and the Little Ogeechee, 
rested upon the Atlantic and Gulf rail way bridge across the Little 
Ogeechee river. This line was well located, and was rendered formidable by 
the succession of low lands and impracticable swamps in its front. In 
order to increase these physical obstructions and add to the 
impracticability of these low lands, the river dam at Williamson's 
plantation was cut so as to allow the water at high tide to flow freely 
into and submerge the rice fields. This supply, when fully obtained, was 
there held. The Savannah and Ogeechee canal in advance of the line being 
higher than the swamp through which it passed, was cut. Its lock, about 
eight miles from the city, was opened, and thus the water from Gould's 
swamp was drawn down and made to contribute to the overflow. The Augusta, 
the Louisville, the Central rail road, and all other causeways 
interrupting the ready flow of the water, were cut. From the left bank of 
the canal at Shaw's to Silk Hope plantation is a continuous line of swamp 
draining into Salt creek at Silk Hope. Between the Confederate line and 
Shaw's settlement the canal was cut in one or two places, and the 

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swamps were filled from it and from the reserves on Shaw's and Lawton's 
plantations. The rice fields on Silk Hope plantation were flooded from the 
Silk Hope back water, and Salt creek was dammed up at the bridge on the 
old Savannah and Darien road, to keep in the water in case the enemy 
should cut the banks. Shaw's back-water dam was also cut, and every means 
resorted to which could contribute to swell the inundation. Thus the 
entire front of the Confederate line, from the Savannah river to Salt 
creek bridge, was submerged to a depth varying from three to six feet. 
Below Salt creek bridge, Salt creek and the marshes of the Little Ogeechee 
afforded substantial protection. So much for the natural advantages of the 
line. 

   The artificial defenses consisted of detached works, located at 
prominent points, commanding the established avenues of approach to the 
city, crowning causeways and private crossings over these low-lands, and 
offering resistance wherever the swamps were practicable. The principal 
batteries were situated as follows: 

   In front of the extreme right of the Confederate line, and across the 
flooded rice field on Williamson's plantation, was an advanced work, the 
left of which rested upon Williamson's canal just beyond the grave-yard, 
which was converted into a redan, 

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and the right upon the Savannah river this side of the negro quarters. 
This was the most elaborate fortification on the line. Its armament 
consisted of ten guns, mostly of light calibre, and it was garrisoned by 
two hundred infantry of the Georgia militia, Pruden's artillery company, 
and the Georgia cadets, Major Capers, all under the command of Colonel 
Hill of the Georgia State forces. This work was open in its rear toward 
the Savannah river upon which it rested. The lunette, which constituted 
its prominent feature, was approached by a covered way, and in it was 
located an ample bomb-proof made by cutting a deep ditch from the salient 
to the bastion line. This ditch was crossed at right angles by another of 
similar dimensions, commencing and terminating at the flank angles 
respectively. These ditches were then roofed with timber and covered with 
the earth removed in making the excavations. Thus was constructed not only 
a commodious bomb proof, but also an excellent magazine. Semi-lunar in 
outline, the enclosed lunette constituted its center, with a redan on the 
left and a semicircular work on the right. The infantry line and curtains 
connecting these were substantial in character and showed a double front. 
The interior front commanded the terre-plein in case the enemy should 
attack from Hutchinson's island. Sand bags were 

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used instead of head logs, and they were so arranged as to permit the 
garrison, while firing, to be entirely under cover. The exterior front was 
protected by a double frieze of stakes and fence-rails planted firmly in 
the ground and interlaced with iron wire. Such was Fort Hardeman, planned 
by and constructed under the supervision of Lieut. Coln. B. W. Frobel of 
the engineers. The labor was performed by the Georgia militia and a detail 
of negroes. On the 9th and 10th of December the enemy attempted to carry 
this work, but the assaults were feeble and easily repulsed. 

   The right of the Confederate line developed into a well traversed field 
work, mounting three 32-pounder guns, resting upon the Savannah river and 
designed to cover Williamson's river dam and its approaches. The 
preservation of this dam was essential to the retention of the water by 
means of which the overflow, to which we have alluded, was in a 
considerable degree accomplished. Between this battery and the Augusta 
road several pieces of artillery were posted in lunettes. 

   At the crossing of the Augusta road a substantial earth work was 
constructed, mounting three heavy guns, with field pieces on the flanks. 

   Battery McBeth, located at the intersection of the Louisville turnpike 
and the Central rail road with the Confederate line, was armed with three 

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32-pounder guns on barbette carriages, and two 24-pounder Blakely rifle 
guns on siege carriages. 

   In supporting distance, and about halfway between the Louisville road 
and the Savannah and Ogeechee canal, were posted a 12-pounder Napoleon gun 
and a 6-pounder bronze field piece. Along the right bank of the canal, and 
in support of the line running through the woods between the canal and the 
high-ground on Daly's farm, were distributed a 12-pounder field piece, a 
12-pounder howitzer, and five 6-pounder guns. The line in front of Daly's 
farm was armed with one 8-inch siege howitzer, a 20-pounder Parrott gun, 
two 12-pounder Napoleon guns, one 12-pounder howitzer, and one 3-inch 
rifle gun. 

   Following the line in the direction of the left, a 12-pounder Napoleon 
gun was put in position at the head of Shaw's dam. Three 12-pounder 
howitzers at Battery Acee commanded Shaw's rice field, and one 12-pounder 
howitzer and two 6-pounder guns were stationed on the Habersham old road. 
Between Battery Acee and the Habersham road was a 12-pounder gun. 

   In rear of Lawton's barn, and at the head of the causeway crossing his 
rice fields, stood Battery Barnes with two 32-pounder guns, two 12-pounder 
Napoleons, and one 12-pounder howitzer. Six hundred yards to the right of 
this battery was a 

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6-pounder gun commanding another causeway, and some five hundred yards 
beyond and in the direction of the Habersham road, was posted a 6-pounder 
gun covering the approach by still another crossing. 

   At Pine-Point battery, opposite the rice fields of the Hon. George S. 
Owens's Silk Hope plantation, six field guns were embrasured; and Battery 
Jones, on the old Savannah and Darien road where it crosses Salt creek, 
was armed with two 32-pounder garrison guns, one 32-pounder carronade, one 
20-pounder Parrott, and four 12-pounder Napoleons. 

   On Barclay's plantation, at the extreme left of the line, several field 
guns were posted for the protection of the Atlantic and Gulf rail road 
bridge over the Little Ogeechee river. 

   In addition to the guns enumerated, field pieces were distributed at 
other advantageous points along the line, and ramps were constructed at 
irregular intervals for the guns of the light batteries which were acting 
as a movable support. 

   The following light batteries had been concentrated for the defense of 
Savannah. 

1. Terrell Artillery, . . . . .4 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 
2. Regular Light Battery, . . . . .2 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 
[One section absent with the cavalry under General Wheeler.] 
3. Anderson's Light Battery, . . . . .4 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 
4. Barnwell's " " . . . . .4 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 

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5. German Light Battery, . . . . . 2 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 
[One section absent with the cavalry south of the Alatamaha.] 
6. Abell's Light Battery, . . . . .2 12-pdr Napoleon guns.
2 12-pdr howitzers. 
7. Pruden's Light Battery 4 6-pdr guns. 
8. Daniell's Light Battery 4 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 
9. Guerard's Light Battery 2 12-pdr Napoleon guns.
2 12-pdr howitzers 
10. Hanleiter's Light Battery 2 12-pdr Napoleon guns. 2 6-pdr guns.
2 12-pdr howitzers. 
11. Mayor Hamilton's battalion of light artillery, ... 2 10-pdr Parrotts.
8 3 and 3 1/2-inch rifles. 
Total . . . . .48 guns.

   Wherever the ground was practicable, these batteries and field works 
were connected by a continuous line of infantry breastworks which the 
troops in position industriously strengthened from day to day as 
opportunity was afforded. Most of the guns in position on this western 
line had been, for this purpose, withdrawn from the eastern lines 
constructed by Brigadier General Mercer during the years 1862 and 1863. 

   This western line for the protection of Savannah against the advance of 
Sherman was subdivided and commanded as follows. The right, extending from 
the Savannah river at Williamson's plantation to within about one hundred 
feet of the Central 

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rail road crossing, garrisoned by the Georgia militia and the State line 
troops, was under the command of Major General Gustavus W. Smith. Twenty 
guns were in position on his front. 

   The command of Major General Lafayette McLaws embraced the batteries at 
the Central rail road and Louisville road crossings, and extended from 
that point to the head of Shaw's dam. On his front twenty-nine pieces of 
artillery were posted. 

   Major General A. R. Wright commanded the left, extending from Shaw's 
dam all the way round to the Atlantic and Gulf railway bridge over the 
Little Ogeechee river. Thirty-two pieces of artillery were in position on 
his front. 

   Lieutenant General William J. Hardee was in general command, with his 
head-quarters in the city of Savannah. For holding this long line less 
than ten thousand infantry, dismounted cavalry, and artillerists were 
assembled; and, for the space of ten days, this little more than a thin 
skirmish line confronted, at close quarters, Sherman's investing army over 
sixty thousand strong. 

   The light artillery companies were distributed as the necessities of 
the line demanded, and were either actively engaged in handling the guns 
in position, or were posted at such convenient distances in the rear that 
they could move immediately to any designated point in their respective 

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fronts. Only two of them were held in reserve park. 

   Four guns, namely, two 18-pounder garrison guns, one 8-inch siege 
howitzer, and a 42-pounder carronade, were placed in battery near the 
Central rail road depot. 

   Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Jones jr., was chief of artillery. 

   On Major General Smith's front, Captain R. W. Anderson acted as chief 
of artillery for that division. Captain J. A. Maxwell was detailed as 
chief of artillery on Major General McLaws' front, and Captain John W. 
Brooks acted in a similar capacity in Major General Wright's division. 

   By assignment of the general commanding, Major Black of his staff was 
designated as inspector on Major General Smith's front; Colonel George A. 
Gordon, volunteer aid, inspector on Major General McLaws' front; and 
Lieut. Colonel S. B. Paul, of the lieutenant general's staff, inspector on 
Major General Wright's front. 

   In anticipation of the siege, every effort had been made by the chief 
of artillery, and the ordnance officer on duty in Savannah, to accumulate 
a supply of ordnance stores. Col. Rains, commanding the Augusta arsenal, 
and the ordnance officer at Charleston extended what aid they could, and 
the consequence was that, apart from the ammunition 

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in the artillery chests and in the temporary magazines along the line, 
there remained a fair amount in reserve. During the progress of the siege 
there was no lack of ammunition; the troops and batteries being at all 
times promptly and sufficiently served. It may be fairly stated, however, 
that as a precautionary measure, the expenditure of ammunition both by the 
artillery and infantry was made the subject of a special order from head 
quarters, enjoining economy and caution. 

   That no scarcity of provisions was encountered during the siege is 
evidenced by the fact that, after sending from the supplies in Savannah to 
Hardeeville, South Carolina, one week's full rations for all the troops 
engaged in the defense of Savannah, there remained on the morning of the 
20th of December unissued and on hand in the commissary department, 30 
bags of corn, 800 tierces and 400 bags of beat rice, 2000 pounds of bacon, 
70 barrels of lard, 150 barrels of molasses, 700 bags of oats, 900 bags of 
ground peas, 1300 bags of wheat, 125 bags of grist, 10 boxes of soap, 560 
bags of cow peas, 17 bales of hay, 225 bags of wheat flour, 400 tierces of 
salt, 36 barrels of whiskey, 1200 casks of unbeaten rice at Habersham's 
mill, and a considerable supply of coffee and sugar. In obedience to the 
orders of Lieut. Genl. Hardee, sixteen thousand pounds of coffee were, by 
Major George Robertson 

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jr., chief commissary in Savannah, shipped on the 5th of December, to 
Major H. C. Guerin chief commissary at Charleston, South Carolina. 

   As an important item showing what may be accepted as an average issue 
of rations during the siege, after the isolation and capture of Fort 
McAllister, and recording with considerable accuracy the commands then 
present in Savannah and its vicinity, we present the following statement 
prepared by the chief commissary of subsistence. 

Military District of Georgia,
Office Issuing Commissary,
Savannah, Decr. 16th, 1864. 


STATEMENT OF RATIONS ISSUED AT THIS OFFICE.

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Rations
Officers, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   129 
Detachments, Couriers and Baggage Guards, . . . . .   130 
Detailed, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    71 
Hospitals and Attendants, . . . . . . . . . . . . .   821 
Steamers Beauregard and Govr. Troup, . . . . . . .     31 
Civilians and Paroled Prisoners Engineer Deptmt., .   100 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,282
RECAPITULATION.
Issues to Confederate Troops, . . . . . . . . . .  1,1291 
Issues to Militia, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    3,249 
Issues to Officers detailed, 
Issues to Hospitals, etc., . . . . .1,282 . . . .  15,822 
Issues to Negroes, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    923 
Total, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,745

   Lt. Coln. T. B. Roy, A. A. G.
Coln. I respectfully present the above statement for the information of 
Lt. Genl. Hardee. * * *
Very Respectfully, 
GEO. ROBERTSON, JR., Maj. & C. S.

   While this statement shows an aggregate issue of 16,745 rations, a 
proper analysis will advise us that after deducting the troops stationed 
in the Third district of Carolina, the artillerists engaged in garrisoning 
the forts along the line of the Savannah river and upon the water 
approaches to the city, the sick in hospitals, the provost guards, men on 
detached services of various sorts, the naval forces, and the negro 
laborers, there scarcely remained ten thousand troops for active duty on 
the western line. 



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CHAPTER VI.
Confederate Forces in the 3d Military District of South Carolina, under 
Maj. Genl. Sam Jones, guarding the Line of the Charleston and Savannah 
Rail Road--Federal Advance from Gregory's Point, and its Repulse near the 
Tullifinney Trestle--Original Confederate Line Conceived for the 
Protection of the Sea Coast of Georgia--Advanced Line Controlling the 
Water Approaches to Savannah--Line of Defense for the Immediate Protection 
of the Eastern and Southern Exposures of the City--Location and Armament 
of the Savannah River Batteries, and of the Forts and Earth-works Erected 
to guard the Water Approaches to the City--Relative Bearings and Distances 
of these Fortifications from Oglethorpe Barracks--Genl. Beauregard's 
Instructions for the Defense of Savannah. 

   Although severely repulsed at Honey Hill on the 30th of November, the 
Federals within a short time set on foot new expeditions with a view to 
obtaining possession of the Charleston and Savannah rail road. As the 
protection of this important line of communication was essential to the 
safety of the garrison at Savannah, General Hardee ordered Major General 
Samuel Jones, commanding at Charleston, to establish his head quarters at 
or near Pocotaligo and carefully watch the movements of the enemy. These 
instructions were given on the 4th of December. The troops in that 
vicinity, under General Jones's command, consisted 

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of the 5th and 47th Georgia Regiments, a battalion of the 32d Georgia 
Regiment, a portion of the 3d Regiment South Carolina cavalry, Kirk's 
squadron of cavalry, some South Carolina reserves and militia, some 
Georgia reserves, and several batteries of light artillery. These forces 
were distributed at various points extending from Pocotaligo to the 
Savannah river, and along the left bank of that river to Sisters ferry, 
and above. Those concentrated at and near Grahamville were under the 
immediate command of Brigadier General Chesnut, and those stationed at and 
near Coosawhatchie were commanded by Brigadier General Gartrell. The 
reserves were poorly organized and imperfectly drilled. The militia was to 
a great extent undisciplined, and lacked arms. 

   On the morning of the 6th of December the enemy effected a landing at 
Gregory's Point on the Tullifinny river. A battalion of the 5th Georgia 
Regiment, sent forward by General Gartrell to contest the advance of the 
enemy, encountered the Federals on the Gregory's point road about a mile 
from its junction with the State road, and at first drove them back a 
short distance. Soon perceiving however, that the opposing force "was 
scarcely a twentieth part of their own numbers," the Federals pressed 
forward and nearly enveloped the 5th Georgia, forcing it back. The Georgia 
reserves 

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and a section of light artillery, ordered by General Gartrell to support 
the 5th Georgia, fell back in confusion after having partially destroyed 
the bridge within range of the Confederate works at Coosawhatchie. Having 
obtained a foothold at the junction of the Gregory's Point road and the 
State road, the Federals immediately commenced intrenching. 

   During the night of the 6th, Major General Jones concentrated on the 
Charleston and Savannah rail road, near the Tullifinny trestle, the 47th 
Georgia Regiment, a battalion of the 32d Georgia, a company of the 1st 
South Carolina Artillery, Major White's battalion of cadets, a battalion 
of North Carolina Reserves which had just arrived, and Bachman's battery 
of light artillery, and ordered Colonel Edwards, the senior colonel, to 
attack the enemy with this force at daylight in the morning. Brigadier 
General Gartrell was directed to make a spirited demonstration from 
Coosawhatchie so soon as he should hear Colonel Edwards's guns: and, if 
Colonel Edwards's movement proved successful, to press forward with the 
attack. Both attacks failed of their object; and General Jones, believing 
that he had not a sufficient number of reliable troops to justify him in 
renewing the assault, endeavored by defensive works to hold the rail road. 
Meanwhile, the enemy was busily occupied in strengthening 

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their position. On the night of the 8th, Brigadier General B. H. Robertson 
was assigned to the immediate command of the troops between Pocotaligo and 
Coosawhatchie. On the morning of the 9th, the Federals, in endeavoring to 
gain possession of the rail road, vigorously assailed the Confederate left 
near Tullifinny, and were handsomely repulsed. Later in the day, having 
massed their forces on their left, they attacked the Confederate line near 
Coosawhatchie, and were again repulsed. Failing in these attacks they 
never renewed them, but contented themselves with strengthening their 
position within less than a mile of the Charleston and Savannah rail road, 
where they established several batteries with which they endeavored, but 
unsuccessfully, to prevent the Confederates from using the road. Although 
these batteries were located within easy range of the road, and although 
the enemy used their artillery freely, the Confederate forces held the 
road continuously, and the passage of trains was never interrupted for an 
entire day until the road was abandoned after the evacuation of Savannah, 
and the withdrawal of troops and materials had been fully accomplished. 
Only one locomotive and a box-car were damaged, and two rails broken by 
the enemy's continued fire. 

   While these operations were in progress near Coosawhatchie, Brigadier 
General Chesnut held 

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the rail road from Bee's creek to Hardeeville, and Colonel Colcock guarded 
the Savannah river to Hudson's ferry, until the arrival of Major General 
Wheeler and Brigadier General Young with their respective commands. 

   We make no apology for referring to these movements and alluding to 
these dispositions of troops, because they had an important bearing upon 
and constituted no mean part of the plan of the defense of Savannah. 

   Prior to the inception of Sherman's march through Georgia, the 
attention of the military commanders at Savannah had been mainly directed 
to the construction of fortifications for the protection of the city 
against water attacks and expeditions advancing directly from the coast. 
The likelihood of any demonstration from the rear had, up to this time, 
been deemed so remote, and the probability of an attack from the coast so 
imminent on more than one occasion, that most of the available labor had 
been expended in the erection and arming of batteries to control the water 
approaches to the city, and in the construction of substantial earth works 
covering the eastern and southern exposures of Savannah. A brief allusion 
to these lines of defense will not, we trust, be deemed irrelevant. 

   The original line conceived for the protection 

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of the sea-coast of Georgia contemplated the erection of earth-works, to 
be armed with 32-pounder guns, at every ship-channel entrance from Tybee 
island to Fernandina. Thus, on the north point of Great Tybee island was a 
small sand battery as an outpost to Fort Pulaski, and an earth-work on 
Warsaw island as an advanced fortification to the Skidaway island 
batteries. In the vicinity of Ossabaw sound no defensive work existed 
exterior to the battery on Green island. Then came Fort McAllister near 
the mouth of the Great Ogeechee river. On the north point of St. Catharine 
island was a small battery; and so the purpose was to pursue this system 
of fortifications as far as the southern extremity of Cumberland island. 

   Such isolated works, feeble in themselves and far removed from a 
convenient base of supplies, were essentially inadequate for the purpose 
for which they were intended, were incapable of resisting anything like a 
determined attack, and, at the commencement of the Confederate struggle 
for independence when the art of war was but partially understood and it 
was deemed an imperative duty to protect every foot of Confederate soil, 
were mainly designed to quiet the fears of the planters on the coast who, 
apprehensive of the approach of armed vessels and marauding parties 
commissioned to annoy exposed localities and disorganize the 

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labor upon their estates, were clamorous for some protection of this sort. 
These outer batteries were held only a short time. Several of them, 
although planned, and partially completed with the aid of slave labor from 
neighboring plantations, were never finished. 

   On the 18th day of February, 1862, the batteries on St. Simons and 
Jekyl islands, designed for the protection of Brunswick, were abandoned, 
and their armaments transferred to more important points. From this time 
onward, during the continuance of the war, the heavy guns on the Georgia 
coast were charged solely with guarding the water approaches to the city 
of Savannah and its vicinity. The advanced line for the control of these 
water approaches was represented by a battery at Red Bluff, Fort Pulaski, 
detached works on Wilmington, Skidaway, and Green islands, and by Fort 
McAllister. There was also an interior line of forts and water batteries 
which, commencing with Fort Jackson and the Savannah river batteries, 
included Fort Bartow, works at Causton's bluff and on Whitmarsh island, 
batteries at Greenwich, Thunderbolt, the Isle of Hope, and at Beaulieu, 
and rested its right on the Rose Dew batteries. Fort Pulaski was isolated 
on the 22d of February, 1862, and passed into the hands of the Federals on 
the 11th of April following. In 

Page 99

March of the same year the battery on Skidaway island was abandoned, and 
its guns were employed in strengthening Thunderbolt battery. About the 
same time the fort on Green island was dismantled, and its armament 
transferred to the battery at Beaulieu. 

   In addition to these defenses, a line of formidable field works, within 
easy range of each other, and in many places connected by curtains, armed 
with siege and field guns, was thrown up for the immediate defense of 
Savannah. Commencing at Fort Boggs on the Savannah river, and thence 
extending south and west in a semi-circular form, enveloping the city at 
distances varying from one to two and a quarter miles, it terminated at 
the Springfield plantation swamp. The principal works in this line were 
Fort Boggs, mounting fourteen guns, some of them quite heavy and 
commanding Savannah river, Fort Brown, near the Catholic cemetery, armed 
with eleven guns, and Fort Mercer having a battery of nine guns. Between 
Springfield plantation swamp where the right of the line rested just 
beyond Laurel Grove cemetery, and Fort Mercer, were eighteen lunettes, 
mounting in the aggregate twenty guns. Connecting Fort Mercer with Fort 
Brown was a cremeilliere line with nine salients, mounting in the 
aggregate eight guns. Between Fort Brown and Fort 

Page 100

Boggs were seven lunettes, mounting in the aggregate eight guns. These 
works were well supplied with magazines. It will be noted that the 
armament of these city lines consisted of seventy pieces of artillery of 
various calibres, among which 32, 24, 18, 12 and 6-pounder guns 
predominated. A considerable supply of ammunition was kept on hand in the 
magazines. Such was the condition of this city line in the month of 
October, 1864. When, however, it became necessary, the month following, to 
arm the western line for the defense of the city against Sherman's army, 
many guns were withdrawn from the city line and placed in battery on the 
western defenses. In fact, the principal supply of guns and ammunition was 
hence derived. The first assignment of guns on the western line was made 
by the writer on the 20th of November. Major General Lafayette McLaws was 
then in command of the district of Georgia; Major John McCrady was acting 
as chief engineer, and Captain L. Jacqueline Smith as ordnance officer. 
When Lieut. General Hardee arrived and assumed command, Colonel J. J. 
Clarke discharged the duties of chief engineer, and Lieut. Col. J. R. 
Waddy was announced as chief ordnance officer. 

   As Federal vessels of war, in anticipation of the approach of Sherman's 
army, had been multiplied along the coast, and as a demonstration in aid 
of 

Page 101

his movement was deemed entirely probable, it was manifestly necessary 
that the forts and batteries commanding the water approaches to the city 
of Savannah should be kept amply garrisoned and properly supplied with 
ammunition. Consequently, during the continuance of the siege, the 
cannoneers were kept at their posts and a strict watch was maintained. As 
but slight changes were made during the siege in the armament of these 
fixed batteries, the following statement of guns in position along the 
water front of the Savannah defenses may be accepted as substantially 
correct. 

   We begin with Red Bluff battery on the Carolina shore, which 
constituted the left of the line. 

   This enclosed work was armed with six guns, as follows: two 24-pounder 
rifle guns, one 8-inch columbiad, one 24 and two 12-pounder howitzers. 

   At the extremity of the bay, in the city of Savannah, was located a 32-
pounder gun. 

   On Hutchinson's island was an earth work mounting three 32-pounder 
guns. 

   The armament of Fort Jackson consisted of two 8-inch columbiads, two 32-
pounder rifle guns, and three 32-pounder naval guns. 

   The other batteries for the defense of the Savannah river proper (aside 
from Fort Boggs whose location and armament have already been mentioned) 
were Cheves, Lawton, and Lee. 

Page 102

   Three 32-pounder guns and two 10-inch columbiads constituted the 
armament of Battery Cheves. 

   That of Battery Lawton was stronger, consisting of one 32-pounder rifle 
gun, one 42-pounder smooth bore, two 8-inch and two 10-inch columbiad 
guns. 

   The most powerful work in the Savannah river was Battery Lee, which 
mounted two 10-inch mortars, two 10-inch and three 8-inch columbiads, one 
42, and one 32-pounder gun, and two 24-pounder howitzers. 

   Fort Bartow, commanding St. Augustine creek not far from its confluence 
with Savannah river, was a substantially constructed, enclosed earth work, 
mounting sixteen guns, to wit: one 10-inch columbiad, two 8-inch naval 
shell guns, two 8-inch columbiads, two 24-pounder rifle guns, one 12-
pounder rifle gun, two 8-pounder and two 6-pounder smooth bore guns, three 
3-inch rifle guns, and one boat howitzer. The water battery at Causton's 
bluff, in advance of Fort Bartow, was armed with two 32-pounder smooth 
bore guns. 

   For the protection of the approaches by way of Whitemarsh island, a 
battery was located at Turner's point mounting three 10-inch columbiads, 
one 20-pounder Parrott gun, and two 12-pounder howitzers; and another at 
Gibson's point which was armed with two 8-inch siege howitzers and two 32-
pounder guns. Across the island was thrown up 

Page 103

a substantial line of field works mounting seven 32-pounder guns, one 4.62-
inch, and one 3-inch rifle gun. Near the head of the causeway leading to 
Causton's bluff were located some lunettes and angles for field pieces. 

   At Greenwich was a battery of three 32-pounder guns. 

   At Thunderbolt was a succession of well traversed earth works, mounting 
one 10-inch columbiad, two 8-inch columbiads, two 8-inch shell guns, one 
42-pounder rifle, one 42-pounder smooth bore, and six 32-pounder guns. The 
batteries on the Isle of Hope were distributed as follows : at Grimball's 
point a small work armed with one 32-pounder; at Grimball's house another, 
mounting two guns of like calibre; and at the Church lot a more formidable 
work mounting two 8-inch columbiads and two 32-pounder guns. Near Skidaway 
bridge was a tête du pont, prepared for the reception of siege pieces or 
light artillery. 

   The point at Beaulieu being an important one, was strongly fortified 
and provided with one 8-inch and two 10-inch columbiads, two 42 and three 
32-pounder guns. A light battery was also stationed within supporting 
distance. 

   Rose Dew battery was armed with three 10-inch columbiads, one 10-inch 
mortar, and one 32 and one 18-pounder rifle gun. 

Page 104

   Colonel Edward C. Anderson was, during the siege, assigned to the 
general command of these fixed batteries. The guns in these positions were 
supplied with an average of rather more than one hundred rounds of 
ammunition to the piece. As additional obstructions to an ascent of the 
Savannah river by the enemy, cribs, filled with brick and stone, had been 
sunk in the channel below the forts and under cover of their guns. Below 
the Thunderbolt battery the river was impeded by quantities of live-oak 
logs. 

   We conclude this allusion to the water defenses of Savannah by an 
enumeration of the guns in position at Fort McAllister near the mouth of 
the Great Ogeechee river. 

   Constituting the right of the exterior line designed and held for the 
protection of Savannah, and situated at Genesis point on the right bank of 
the Great Ogeechee river, it effectually commanded the channel of that 
river, shielded the important rail road bridge across the Ogeechee near 
Way's station on the Atlantic and Gulf rail road, and preserved the 
important and numerous rice-plantations in its neighborhood from 
molestation and demoralization. From the day of its construction, which 
was coëval with the earliest Confederate defenses on the Georgia coast, to 
the hour of its capture on the 13th of December, 1864, it 

Page 105

subserved purposes most conducive to the general welfare, and on various 
occasions gallantly repulsed well sustained naval attacks from the enemy. 

   Although the mantle of decay is spread above its deserted magazines and 
rank weeds are choking its vacant gun-chambers, the heroic memories which 
it has bequeathed and the noble part it sustained in the Confederate 
struggle for independence will not be forgotten in the lapse of years or 
lightly esteemed in the record of truth and valor. No name is more proudly 
remembered on the Georgia coast than that of this now almost obliterated 
earth-work near the mouth of the Great Ogeechee. Seven times did it 
successfully withstand the attacks of Federal gun-boats and iron-clads 
attempting its demolition. During its bombardment of the 27th of January, 
1863, for the first time in the history of naval warfare were 15-inch guns 
used in the effort to reduce a shore battery; and here was demonstrated 
the ability of sand-parapets to resist the disintegrating effect of guns 
of the heaviest calibre. After the attack of the 3d of March, 1863, in 
which its bermuda covered parapets for seven long hours were rained upon 
by four monitors, three 13-inch mortar schooners, and five gun boats, the 
enemy never renewed their efforts for its reduction, and the Confederate 
flag floated proudly from its parade 

Page 106

until that hour when it went down amid the smoke and carnage of General 
Hazen's assault. 

   The mission of this work was the defense of the Great Ogeechee river, 
and to that end were its guns disposed. The rear of the fort, however, was 
protected by a suitable infantry line, strengthened at intervals by ramps 
for field artillery, not with a view to offering any protracted defense 
against a serious investment from the land side, but for the purpose of 
repulsing any attempt to carry the fort by assault by expeditions landed 
for that purpose. Torpedoes planted in the river, under the guns of this 
battery, materially aided in its defense, and late in the fall of 1864 sub-
terra shells were located in rear of the fort. 

   The armament of Fort McAllister in the fall of 1864, was as follows: 
One 10-inch mortar, one 8-inch and two 10-inch columbiads, one 42-pounder 
gun, one 32-pounder rifle and one 32-pounder smooth bore gun, one 24-
pounder howitzer, two 12-pounder mountain howitzers, and six 6-pounder 
field guns. In the magazines was a supply of rather more than one hundred 
and fifty rounds of ammunition to the piece. Captain Clinch's light 
battery was stationed in the neighborhood to act as a support, and to 
occupy, as the emergency arose, some light field works which had been 
thrown up at advantageous points along the banks 

Page 107

of the river between the fort and the rail road crossing. 

   In anticipation of the early isolation of Fort McAllister, and in 
recognition of the fact that so soon as General Sherman's army should have 
fully enveloped the western lines of Savannah no communication could be 
had with nor relief offered to this post, on the morning of the 8th of 
December 1000 pounds of bacon, 2250 pounds of hard bread, and other 
supplies amounting in all to thirty-two days' rations for two hundred men, 
were issued from Savannah and safely conveyed to the fort. Extra issues of 
40 gallons of whiskey, 40 gallons of molasses, 50 pounds of candles, and 
some soap and salt were issued and received at the same time. 

   The following day fifteen days' rations were added to the above, so 
that the fort was amply provisioned. 

   Major George W. Anderson was in command, and the garrison numbered 
about one hundred and fifty men. 

   In consequence of the withdrawal of the small infantry force which, 
under Coln. Fizer, had been disputing the advance of Osterhaus's column on 
the right bank of the Great Ogeechee river, and by the retreat of the 
Confederate cavalry, under Coln. Hood, in the direction of Liberty county, 
Fort McAllister was, on the morning of the 11th of 

Page 108

December, left in an absolutely isolated condition, without any reasonable 
hope of support or relief from any quarter. 

   That the garrison was not recalled in time within the lines of Savannah 
and the post seasonably evacuated, can be explained only on the 
supposition that the Confederate commander hoped and believed by a bold 
retention of this outpost and as strong a display of resistance as 
practicable, Sherman, even at that late day, might be induced to avoid 
Savannah and seek some other and more facile point on the coast for 
communicating with the Federal fleet. And yet, in view of the overwhelming 
strength of the Union army and its manifest determination toward Savannah, 
such an idea could scarcely have been reasonably entertained. The 
abandonment of Fort McAllister, with its feeble garrison, to its own 
resources, can hardly be justified. 

   The following dispatches from General Beauregard to Lieut. General 
Hardee indicate the general instructions furnished for the tenure and 
defense of Savannah. 

Page 109

Montgomery, Ala., Dec. 3d, 1864.
7 A. M. To Lieut. Genl. W. J. Hardee,
Savannah, Ga.,
Via Tallahassee, Fla.: 

   I leave to-day for Augusta, and Savannah. Construct loop-holes and 
embrasures on defenses of latter city. Works along overflows around city 
are essential. Obstruct all roads from Millen to Port Royal, Ossabaw 
Sound, and Brunswick. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD.


Charleston, S. C., December 8th, 1864. Lieut. Genl. Hardee, 
Savannah, Ga.: 

   Having no army of relief to look to, and your forces being essential to 
the defense of Georgia and South Carolina, whenever you shall have to 
select between their safety and that of Savannah, sacrifice the latter and 
form a junction with Genl. Jones, holding the left bank of the Savannah 
river and the rail road to this place as long as possible. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD.


Savannah, Ga., Dec. 9, 1864.
Lt. Genl. W. J. Hardee,
Commdg., etc.
General: 

   It is my desire, after the consultation that has taken place, that you 
should hold this city so long as in your judgment it may be advisable to 
do so, bearing in mind 

Page 110

that should you have to decide between a sacrifice of the garrison or 
city, you will preserve the garrison for operations elsewhere. 

Very Respectfully 
Yours, etc., 
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.


Charleston, S. C., 13 Dec., 1864.
Lt. Genl. Hardee, 
Savannah, Ga.: 

   About four hundred and fifty men will be sent you to-day with 
instructions to Genl. Jones to divert them, if necessary, to defenses of 
New river and those east Screven's ferry causeway. These reënforcements 
are the last you and Jones, who is subject to your orders, can hope for. 
Keep yourself well advised, through staff-officers and otherwise, of his 
ability to hold your communication; for Savannah must be held only so long 
as is consistent with the safety of its garrison. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.


Charleston, S. C., Dec. 15, 1864.
11:30 A. M. 
Lt. Genl. Hardee. 
Savannah, Ga.: 

   Under no circumstances must you be cut off from junction of your forces 
with those of Genl. Jones. The safety of Georgia and South Carolina 
depends upon the result. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General. 



Page 111

CHAPTER VII.
Distribution of Confederate Forces along the Western Line--Federal 
Timidity and Hesitation--Capture of the Dispatch Boat Ida--Affair at 
Shaw's Dam--Repulse of the Assault upon Fort Hardeman--The Tender Resolute 
captured by the Enemy--Federal Movement against Fort McAllister--Assault 
upon and Capture of that Work by Hazen's Division--Reports of Major 
Anderson and of Brig. Genl. Hazen--Gallant Conduct of the Garrison. 

   The western lines, about which the chief interest concentres, have 
already been sufficiently described. They were begun so soon as it was 
ascertained that Sherman had commenced his movement from Atlanta, and were 
constructed as rapidly as available labor and means would permit. The 
credit of their location is due to Major John McCrady, then chief engineer 
of the district, under the directions of Major General Lafayette McLaws. 
On the 20th of November the first assignment of guns was made for their 
armament, and others were hastened into position as rapidly as they could 
be withdrawn from the city lines and other localities from which they 
could be spared. 

   Troops for the occupation of these lines commenced taking their posts 
on the 7th of December, and at once entered, with much activity, upon the 

Page 112

task of strengthening them and extending the infantry cover. 

   Major General Gustavus W. Smith's troops, numbering about 2000 muskets, 
were disposed on the right, from the Savannah river almost to the crossing 
of the Central rail road--a front of about two miles and a half. His right 
was commanded by Brig. Genl. Anderson, and his left by Brig. Genl. 
Carswell. The two regiments of the State line were posted near the 
Louisville road, and the First brigade of militia near the Augusta road. 
The intermediate line was occupied by the battalion of Cadets. The Second 
and Third brigades of Georgia militia held the line from the Augusta road 
to the bank of the Savannah river; and Fort Hardeman, the advanced work 
across Williamson's rice field, was occupied by Colonel Hill with a 
detachment from the Third Georgia brigade, a detachment of Cadets, and 
Pruden's militia battery. A portion of Anderson's Confederate light 
battery, and a part of Major Hamilton's battalion of light artillery were 
conveniently posted in support. 

   Major General Lafayette McLaws' front, forming the center of the line, 
commenced about one hundred feet to the right of the Central rail road 
crossing, and terminated at the swamp to the left of the Daly farm. 
Measured along the entrenchments, its length was about three miles and 
three 

Page 113

quarters. His right was commanded by Brig Genl. Baker, and his left by 
Brig. Genl. Lewis. Genl. Baker's forces consisted of North Carolina troops 
and Georgia and South Carolina artillerists. Those under Genl. Lewis 
consisted of Worthen's North Carolina battalion, detachments of the 4th 
Tennessee and the 12th South Carolina Cavalry, the 2d, 4th, and 9th, 
Kentucky Mounted Infantry, the 3d battalion Georgia Reserves, Major Cook's 
Athens battalion, the 5th regiment Georgia Reserves, and the 1st regiment 
Georgia Regulars. 

   Daniell's light battery, Abell's light battery, and sections of the 
light batteries of Captains Barnwell and Wagner supported this portion of 
the line. The troops on General McLaws' front numbered about 3750 men. 

   Major General A. R. Wright, on the 11th of December, was assigned to 
the command of the left of the western lines extending from the Daly farm, 
or Telfair swamp, to the Atlantic and Gulf rail road bridge over the 
Little Ogeechee river--a distance of some seven miles. He had under him 
Brig. General Hugh W. Mercer, commanding his right from the Telfair swamp 
to a point east of Lawton's house, and Brig. Genl. John K. Jackson, 
commanding his left from Lawton's house to the Atlantic and Gulf rail road 
crossing over the Little Ogeechee river. This front of Major Genl. Wright 

Page 114

was irregular, being interrupted by dense woods and impracticable swamps. 
It was held by about 2700 men; twelve hundred under Brig. Genl. Mercer, 
and the rest under Brig. Genl. Jackson. Genl. Mercer's command consisted 
of Coln. Browne's local brigade (composed of Major Jackson's Augusta 
battalion, Major Adams's Athens battalion, and a regiment of local troops 
under Colonel Nisbet), Brooks foreign battalion, a detachment of the 55th 
Georgia regiment, and Capt. Barnes's company of artillerists from Augusta. 
This force was disposed as follows: Lt. Coln. R. B. Nisbet, with Adams's 
Athens battalion, a portion of the 1st Regiment of Augusta local infantry, 
and Clemon's battalion Augusta local infantry, occupied the line from 
Battery Richardson to Battery Barnwell. Griffin's detachment of the 55th 
Georgia regiment supported batteries Wheeler and Simpkins, and Jackson's 
Augusta battalion of local infantry occupied the line from the last named 
work to Battery Barnes, which was held by the Augusta artillerists under 
Captain George Barnes. Brooks's foreign battalion was posted near the left 
of Battery Barnes. 

   Brig. Genl. Jackson's command was composed of Coln. Von Zinken's local 
troops, drawn from the Confederate arsenals and work-shops of Columbus and 
elsewhere in the state of Georgia, 

Page 115

detachments from Genl. Ferguson's brigade of cavalry, dismounted, and 
local reserves from Savannah. Brooks's light battery was stationed at 
Battery Jones, at the crossing of the old Savannah and Darien stage road 
over Salt creek, and Capt. Guerard's light battery, sections of Maxwell's 
and Barnwell's light batteries, and a detachment of Major Hamilton's 
artillery battalion supported this line of Genl. Wright, being disposed at 
important points. 

   Every effort was made, by the erection of batteries and infantry 
entrenchments, by digging rifle pits and constructing substantial covers, 
by felling trees in its front and by flooding all approaches, to render 
this western line as formidable as the labor and materials at command 
would permit. Its efficiency, in conjunction with the artificial overflow 
in its front, will be conceded when it is remembered that for ten days it 
kept Sherman's formidable army at bay. And yet, thirteen miles long as it 
was, and held by scarcely more than a skirmish line strengthened at 
intervals, it must be admitted that if the Federals had massed their 
forces for a determined assault, they could, any day during the 
continuance of the siege, have carried it. With an army more than six 
times that of the Confederates, and this Confederate force composed in 
great majority of detailed men, reserves, militia 

Page 116

and boys unusued to action, it seems marvellous that Genl. Sherman should 
have contented himself with sitting down before our lines, erecting 
counter batteries, engaging in artillery duels and sharp-shooting, feeling 
for weak points day after day, after the capture of Fort McAllister making 
arrangements for the transportation of heavy guns with which to shell 
Savannah at great distances and over the heads of her defenders, and 
finally suffering the garrison to withdraw by pontoon bridges and canal 
banks to the Carolina shore. 

   Had he indicated that activity and energy demanded by the situation, 
the probabilities are that he could have captured the entire Confederate 
army. That he did not do so, reflects severely upon him as a soldier and a 
commander. The evacuation of Savannah and the subsequent seizure of many 
thousand bales of private cotton afforded the Federal general an 
opportunity for a festive interchange of dispatches with the President of 
the United States, in which his famous "Christmas present" figures 
largely; but he pillaged a nest from which the eagle had flown, and all 
the balderdash which has been written and spoken about this vaunted "march 
to the sea" can never, in the clear light of history, cover up or excuse 
the lack of dash and the want of ordinary military skill and precaution 
betrayed by General Sherman, with the 

Page 117

formidable force at his command, in permitting the Confederate garrison to 
retire unmolested by a route so precarious in its character, and by a 
flank movement which could have been easily frustrated by a single 
division. 

   December 10th. The enemy destroyed two miles of the Charleston and 
Savannah rail road and appeared at all points along our western line, 
driving in our pickets. Captain Gildersleeve, of the 150th New York 
regiment, captured the Confederate dispatch steam boat Ida, taking 
thirteen prisoners, among whom was Coln. J. H. M. Clinch, volunteer aid to 
Lieut. Genl. Hardee, who was at the time proceeding up the Savannah river 
with orders from Lieut. Genl. Hardee to the naval officer in command of 
the Confederate gun boats lying above. The Ida was burned. 

   Our artillery opened freely upon the Federal forces as they showed 
themselves in coming into position. The Confederate troops were busily 
engaged in strengthening our works and in throwing up strong infantry 
defenses. Toward evening an attempt was made to force the dam across 
Shaw's rice field. This effort was handsomely repulsed. Our line was felt 
almost along its entire length, and at some points quite vigorously. 

   December 11th. The enemy renewed the contest for the possession of 
Shaw's dam, opening fire from 

Page 118

a battery which had been advantageously posted during the night of the 
10th. This struggle was continued at intervals during the day, and was met 
by the infantry command of Lieut. Coln. Nisbet and the field guns of 
Lieutenants Elliott and Acee. The Federal battery was silenced, and before 
dark the enemy withdrew under cover of the woods. In this affair the 
Confederates sustained a loss of two killed, nine wounded, and two 
missing. 

   Heavy artillery firing occurred at the Salt creek(1) and Pine point 
batteries, along the line at Daly's farm, and at the crossings of the 
Louisville, Central, and Augusta roads. In the afternoon an attempt was 
made to carry Fort Hardeman, the advanced work in front of the right of 
our line, but the assaulting column was easily driven back. During 

(1) It is worthy of remark that this Salt creek battery, during the 
progress of the siege, encountered a continuous and violent artillery and 
infantry fire from the enemy, who erected counter batteries to the right 
and left of the old Darien road on the plantations of the Hon. George S. 
Owens and Coln. Edward C. Anderson, and within easy range. The artillery 
fire at this point was more constant and heavier than at any other on the 
Confederate line. The Confederate practice was admirable, the enemy's guns 
on more than one occasion having been completely silenced. Especial credit 
is due to Captain John W. Brooks, and his excellent company, the Terrell 
artillery, for the skill and bravery with which the guns in this battery 
were handled.

Page 119

the night two companies of the 3d Wisconsin crossed the Savannah river to 
Argyle island, and were there reënforced the next morning by six 
additional companies from the same regiment. 

   December 12th. Our artillery was engaged along the line, and 
considerable sharp shooting occurred on both sides. At Daly's farm the 
muzzle of a 12-pounder gun was shot away by a 3-inch rifle gun, and the 
carriage of another 12-pounder gun was cut down by a cannon shot. A 32-
pounder gun at Battery Jones, on Salt creek, was disabled in a similar 
way. 

   Two Confederate gun boats, in attempting to descend the river, were 
driven back by Winnegar's battery which had been placed in position at 
Tweedside plantation so as to command the channel between Argyle island 
and the Georgia shore. The tender Resolute ran aground and was taken 
possession of by Coln. Hawley of the 3d Wisconsin. This boat was unarmed, 
and at the time of her capture had on board five naval officers and a crew 
of nineteen men, who were all made prisoners. 

   During the day the enemy, with a section of De Grase's light battery 
stationed near Dr. Cheves's rice mill on the left bank of the Great 
Ogeechee, opened fire at long range upon Fort McAllister. The fort 
responded, but little if any damage occurred on either side. 

Page 120

   December 13th. The country around Savannah being thinly populated and 
yielding supplies less generous than those which had been encountered 
during the march through Upper and Middle Georgia, and General Sherman's 
army having well nigh consumed the provisions transported in the wagons, 
and being largely restrained from foraging in the rear by Confederate 
cavalry, the Federal troops when massed before the western lines were 
forced to rely for subsistence mainly upon the rice found upon the 
neighboring plantations. It was evident that so many men could not long be 
maintained in their present situation. Rice--straw and moss were the only 
provender which could be obtained for the animals. Under this pressure the 
anxiety of the Federal general to establish early communication with the 
fleet was greatly increased. He endeavored, through his cavalry sent to 
prominent points along the shores of Bryan and Liberty counties, and more 
particularly by means of a signal station at Dr. Cheves's rice mill, to 
attract the notice of the Federal vessels which he was persuaded were 
hovering about the coast in anticipation of his arrival. About midday on 
the 13th of December, the signal officers at Cheves's rice mill succeeded 
in engaging the attention of a steamer near the mouth of the Great 
Ogeechee river, which subsequently proved to be a tug sent by Genl. 

Page 121

Foster and Admiral Dahlgren to observe the coast for signals from 
Sherman's army. 

   Hemmed in by Confederate cavalry and light artillery guarding the left 
bank of the Savannah river, General Sherman hesitated to attempt the 
passage of that stream and to inaugurate a movement to the coast of South 
Carolina across the rice fields opposite Savannah. The less hazardous 
method of effecting a convenient lodgment where United States vessels 
could easily approach and minister to the wants of his army was by taking 
possession of the Great Ogeechee river. In order to do this, the capture 
of Fort McAllister, now wholly isolated, became necessary. 

   King's bridge across the Great Ogeechee river, on the line of the old 
Savannah and Darien stage road, had been burnt by the Confederates upon 
their withdrawal within the lines around Savannah. It was however, 
reconstructed in a substantial manner by the 58th Indiana, under the 
supervision of Captain Reese of the engineer corps, and was, by the night 
of the 12th, ready for the passage of troops. 

   The second division of the 15th Army Corps, consisting of seventeen 
regiments under the command of Brig. Genl. Hazen, was, on the morning of 
the 13th, put in motion for the capture of Fort McAllister. Crossing the 
Great Ogeechee at Kings 

Page 122

bridge and, as soon as the high ground had been attained, marching along 
the main road which runs parallel with the river, this force arrived in 
the vicinity of the fort about one o'clock in the afternoon. Deploying his 
division so as to completely invest the work, with both flanks of his 
command resting upon the Great Ogeechee, and with sharp shooters and 
skirmishers posted behind the trunks of trees whose branches had been used 
by the Confederates for the construction of abattis around the land 
approaches to the fort, for four hours the Federal commander harrassed the 
garrison and watched his opportunity for making the purposed assault. 

   About five o'clock P. M. General Sherman who, from Cheves's rice mill 
had been narrowly observing these operations, signalled Genl. Hazen it was 
important he should carry the fort that afternoon. Accordingly General 
Hazen advanced at once to the assault, moving with his whole force against 
the fort, sweeping over the abattis and rear defenses, and in a short time 
effecting its capture with a loss to his command of one hundred and thirty-
four officers and men killed and wounded. 

   For the following account of this assault upon and capture of Fort 
McAllister we are indebted to Major George W. Anderson, the officer in 
command, whose name and services had been long and 

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honorably associated with the defense of this memorable earth work. 

   Hearing incidentally that the Confederate forces on Cannouchee had 
evacuated that position and retired across the Great Ogeechee, and 
learning that a large column of the enemy was approaching in the direction 
of Fort McAllister, I immediately detached a scouting party under command 
of Second Lieutenant T. O'Neal, of Clinch's light battery, to watch them 
and acquaint me with their movements. This was absolutely necessary, as 
the cavalry previously stationed in Bryan county had been withdrawn, and I 
was thus thrown upon my own resources for all information relating to the 
strength and designs of the enemy. On the morning of the 12th of December, 
1864, I accompanied Lieutenant O'Neal on a scout, and found the enemy 
advancing in force from King's bridge. We were hotly pursued by their 
cavalry, and had barely time to burn the barns of Messrs. Thomas C. Arnold 
and William Patterson, which were filled with rice. The steam tug 
Columbus, lying about three miles above the fort, was also burned. Early 
the next morning one of my pickets, stationed at the head of the causeway 
west of the fort, was captured by the enemy, to whom he imparted the fact 
that the causeway was studded with torpedoes in time to prevent their 
explosion. He also acquainted them with the strength of the garrison, and 
the armament of the fort, and the best approaches to it.

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   About eight o'clock, A. M. desultory firing commenced between the 
skirmishers of the enemy and my sharpshooters. At ten o'clock the fight 
became general, the opposing forces extending from the river entirely 
around to the marsh on the east. The day before, the enemy had established 
a battery of Parrott guns on the opposite side of the river, distant from 
the fort mile and a half, which fired upon us at regular intervals during 
that day and the ensuing night.(1) Receiving from head quarters neither 
orders nor responses to my telegraphic dispatches, I determined under the 
circumstances, and notwithstanding the great disparity of numbers between 
the garrison and the attacking forces, to defend the fort to the last 
extremity. The guns being en barbette, the detachments serving them were 
greatly exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharp shooters. To such an 
extent was this the case, that in one instance, out of a detachment of 
eight men three were killed and three more wounded. The Federal skirmish 
line was very heavy, and the fire so close and rapid that it was at times 
impossible to work our guns. My sharp shooters did all in their power, but 
were entirely too few to suppress this galling fire upon the artillerists. 
In view of the large force of the enemy, consisting of nine regiments 
whose aggregate strength was estimated between 3,500 and 4,000 muskets, 
and possessing the ability to increase it at any time should it become 
necessary, and recollecting 

(1) The light artillery here alluded to consisted of a section of De 
Grase's battery, posted near the rice mill on Dr. Cheves's plantation.

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the feebleness of the garrison of the fort, numbering only 150 effective 
men, it was evident, cut off from all support, and with no possible hope 
of reënforcements from any quarter, that holding the fort was simply a 
question of time. There was but one alternative, death or captivity. 
Captain Thomas S. White, the engineer in charge, had previously felled the 
trees in the vicinity of the fort and demolished the mortar magazine which 
commanded the fort to a very considerable extent. For lack of necessary 
force and time, however, the felled timber and the ruins of the adjacent 
houses which had been pulled down had not been entirely removed. Protected 
by this cover, the enemy's sharp shooters were enabled to approach quite 
near, to the great annoyance and injury of the cannoneers. One line of 
abattis had been constructed by the engineer, and three lines would have 
been completed around the fort but for the want of time and material.

   Late in the afternoon the full force of the enemy made a rapid and 
vigorous charge upon the works, and, succeeding in forcing their way 
through the abattis, rushed over the parapet of the fort, carrying it by 
storm, and, by virtue of superior numbers, overpowered the garrison 
fighting gallantly to the last. In many instances the Confederates were 
disarmed by main force. The fort was never surrendered. It was captured by 
overwhelming numbers. So soon as the enemy opened fire upon the fort from 
the opposite side of the river, it was evident that two of the magazines 
were seriously endangered, and it became necessary to protect them from 
that fire by the erection of suitable traverses. 

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The labor expended in their construction, in the mounting of guns on the 
rear of the work, and in removing the debris above referred to, occupied 
the garrison constantly night and day for nearly forty-eight hours 
immediately preceding the attack. Consequently, at the time of the 
assault, the men were greatly fatigued and in bad plight, physically 
considered, for the contest. I think it not improper to state here, that a 
short time before the approach of the enemy a member of the torpedo 
department had, in obedience to orders, placed in front of the fort and 
along the direct approaches, a considerable number of sub-terra shells, 
whose explosions killed quite a number of the enemy while passing over 
them.

   After the capture of the fort, General Sherman in person ordered my 
engineer, with a detail of sixteen men from the garrison, then prisoners 
of war, to remove all the torpedoes which had not exploded. This hazardous 
duty was performed without injury to any one; but it appearing to me to be 
an unwarrantable and improper treatment of prisoners of war, I have 
thought it right to refer to it in this report.

   I am pleased to state that in my endeavors to hold the fort I was nobly 
seconded by the great majority of officers and men under my command. Many 
of them had never been under fire before, and quite a number were very 
young, in fact mere boys. Where so many acted gallantly, it would be 
invidious to discriminate; but I cannot avoid mentioning those who came 
more particularly under my notice. I would therefore most respectfully 
call the attention of the 

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general commanding to the gallant conduct of Captain Clinch, who, when 
summoned to surrender by a Federal captain, responded by dealing him a 
severe blow on the head with his sabre. (Captain Clinch had previously 
received two gun shot wounds in the arm). Immediately a hand to hand fight 
ensued. Federal privates came to the assistance of their officer, but the 
fearless Clinch continued the unequal contest until he fell bleeding from 
eleven wounds (three sabre wounds, six bayonet wounds, and two gun shot 
wounds), from which, after severe and protracted suffering, he has barely 
recovered. His conduct was so conspicuous, and his cool bravery so much 
admired, as to elicit the praise of the enemy and even of General Sherman 
himself.

   First Lieutenant William Schirm fought his guns until the enemy entered 
the fort, and, notwithstanding a wound in the head, gallantly remained at 
his post, discharging his duties with a coolness and efficiency worthy of 
all commendation.

   Lieutenant O'Neal whom I placed in command of the scouting party before 
mentioned, while in the discharge of that duty and in his subsequent 
conduct during the attack, merited the honor due to a faithful and gallant 
officer.

   Among those who nobly fell, was the gallant Hazzard, whose zeal and 
activity were worthy of all praise. He died as a true soldier--at his post 
facing overwhelming odds.

   The garrison consisted of

   The Emmett Rifles, Captain George A. Nicoll commanding, numbering for 
duty, 25 men.

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   Clinch's light battery, Captain N. B. Clinch commanding, numbering for 
duty, 50 men.

   Company D, 1st Regiment Georgia Reserves, Captain Henry commanding, 
numbering for duty, 28 men.

   Company E, 1st Regiment Georgia Reserves, Captain Morrison commanding, 
numbering for duty, 47 men.

   Total, 150 men.

Casualties.
Commissioned--Captain N. B. Clinch. Eleven wounds. 
Captain Morrison. Shot through both legs. 
First Lieut. Schirm. Shot in the head. 
Killed, Second Lieut. Hazzard. 
Privates and non-commissioned--Killed, 16; wounded, 28. 
Total killed and wounded, 48.

   General Hazen in his official report thus commemorates the services of 
his command during the investment and assault. 

   "At daybreak, the thirteenth, the troops were put in motion, reaching 
the vicinity of McAllister at about eleven A. M. About one mile from the 
fort a picket was captured, revealing the whereabouts of a line of 
torpedoes across the road. Some time was lost in safely removing them, 
when, leaving eight regiments at that point, nine were carried forward to 
about six hundred yards from the fort, 

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and deployed, with a line of skirmishers thrown sufficiently near the fort 
to keep the gunners from working their guns with any effect: those firing 
to the rear being in barbette. 

   "The grounds to the right of the fort being marshy, cut through by deep 
streams, rendered the deployment of that part of the line slow and 
difficult, and was not completely effected till forty-five minutes past 4 
P. M., at which time every officer and man of the nine regiments being 
instructed what to do, the bugle sounded the forward, and at precisely 
five o'clock the fort was carried. 

   "The troops were deployed in our line as thin as possible, the result 
being that no man in the assault was struck till they came to close 
quarters. Here the fighting became desperate and deadly. Just outside the 
works a line of torpedoes had been placed, many of which were exploded by 
the tread of the troops, blowing many men to atoms; but the line moved on 
without checking, over, under, and through abattis, ditches, palisading, 
and parapet, fighting the garrison through the fort to their bomb-proofs, 
from which they still fought, and only succumbed as each man was 
individually overpowered. Our losses were twenty-four officers and men 
killed, and one hundred and ten officers and men wounded." 

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   Among the golden deeds wrought by Confederates in their gigantic 
struggle for right, property, home, and national independence, the defense 
of Fort McAllister against seven naval attacks and this final assault will 
be proudly reckoned. The heroic memories of this earth-work will be 
cherished long after its parapets and deserted gun-chambers shall have 
been wasted into nothingness by the winds and rains of the changing 
seasons. Utterly isolated, cut off from all possible relief-- capture or 
death the only alternative--the conduct of this little garrison, in the 
face of such tremendous odds, was gallant in the extreme. 

   How quickly beats the Confederate pulse, how strong the heart-throb of 
every true Georgian as he garners these among the brave memories of his 
land and people, recollections which neither the lapse of time nor the 
political fortunes of the hour can impair. 

   No higher tribute can be paid to the valor with which this fort was 
defended than that contained in the Federal report to which we have just 
alluded: "We fought the garrison through the fort to their bomb-proofs, 
from which they still fought, and only succumbed as each man was 
individually over-powered."